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What are the debates on same-sex 
marriage and on the recognition of 
transwomen as women about? On anti-
descriptivism and revisionary analysis 
 
Abstract: In recent years, debates on same-sex marriage and the recognition of transwomen as women have been 
raging. These debates often seem to revolve around the meaning of, respectively, the word “marriage” and “woman”. 
That such debates should take place might be puzzling. It seems that if debates on gay and transgender rights revolve 
around the meaning of these words, then those in favor of same-sex marriage and of the recognition of transwomen 
as women have no room left to maneuver. However, prima facie, the pro- and anti-, in both cases, have genuine 
disagreements over the meaning of these words: though the analyses of revisionary theorists are revisionary, they are 
analyses. Sally Haslanger and other philosophers in her wake have appealed to an anti-descriptivist externalist view 
of meaning to provide the conceptual foundations of this practice of revisionary theorizing: revisionary analyses bring 
to light what, unbeknownst to us, these words mean. In this paper, I argue that a descriptivist externalist view should 
be preferred instead. My argument rests on the thesis that what is contested in these debates is the (descriptive) 
meaning of the words ‘marriage’ and ‘women’ as used in the law. 
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Participants to debates about same-sex marriage disagree about whether the law of their respective 
countries should allow same-sex marriage. Many (if not most) of the arguments put forward by 
opponents to same-sex marriage purport to show that, by definition, persons of the same-sex 
cannot get married. Now, though one might think that the meaning of the word 'marriage', in the 
context of these debates, indeed includes, among other things, the idea that it unites a man and a 
woman and that, consequently, a proper response to these arguments would be to push for a 
replacement of this word by another one1, this is not the way many (if not most) proponents of 
same-sex marriage respond2. Consider, for example, the following argument: 
(1) A marriage is a union of a man and a woman. 
(2) If a marriage is a union of a man and a woman, same sex couples cannot marry. 
(C) Same-sex couples cannot marry.  
To this argument, many (if not most) of the proponents of same-sex marriage respond that a 
marriage is not a union between a man and a woman. This is somewhat puzzling. And, more 
puzzling still: the opponents to same-sex marriage do not always reply by way of metalinguistic 
arguments, like: 'This is not what we mean by "marriage"'. Let's call this back and forth an 
argumentative exchange. In recent years, social philosophers and philosophers of language have 
                                                          
1 I here take words to be individuated partly by their meaning. Thus, such a replacement could conserve the form 
'marriage'. 
2 I need to make two terminological remarks. First, debates like these have taken place in countries where same sex-
marriage is now legal and are taking place in countries in which it isn't. For simplicity, I won't make this distinction 
in most of the paper. Thus, when I write 'these debates' and use the present tense, I should be taken to refer to and 
characterize all these debates, past and present. (Of course, it is likely that in countries in which same-sex marriage 
is now legal, the meaning of the word 'marriage' doesn't include the idea that it unites a man and a woman anymore; 
hence the qualification: 'in the context of these debates'). Second, these debates can still take place in countries in 
which same-sex marriage is now legal. In these countries, the pro same sex-marriage should properly be called the 
'defenders' of same-sex marriage, not its 'proponents'. For simplicity though, I will use the word 'proponents' to 
designate both those who argue for the existence of same-sex marriage and those who argue in its defence. 
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been trying to determine how this argumentative exchange should be interpreted. In doing so, they 
set for themselves the following constraint: 'we should look for an interpretation of these 
arguments and our response to them that makes sense of what we are doing'34 (Ball 2020, 40). This 
constraint gives rise to two requirements on an interpretation of this argumentative exchange: 'It 
must give parties to the debate reasonably good epistemic status with respect to what they say (Ball 
2020, 40) and 'It must make assertions relevant to the debate' (Ball 2020, 40). 
For convenience I will call this argumentative exchange the marriage debate - being well aware 
that there is more than one. One possibility is to interpret the marriage debate in such a way that 
the proponents of same-sex marriage are using a different word.  However, such an interpretation 
ascribes an error both to them and their opponents: to the former ones because they don't see that 
their argumentative strategy cannot but be unsuccessful, to the latter because they fail to point that 
out. I will call this interpretation of the marriage debate the changing the subject interpretation5. It 
clearly doesn't satisfy the interpretative constraint just laid out. One might wonder, then, whether 
there wouldn't be an alternative to (Change). And indeed, such an alternative has been put forward 
and it has risen to prominence in recent years. According to this interpretation, what the proponents 
of same-sex marriage do when they object to this kind of argument is to put forward a revisionary 
analysis of the word 'marriage' and what the opponents to same sex-marriage do in reply is to argue 
against such a revision. They don't deny that giving a revisionary analysis of a word is possible, 
they deny that it is legitimate in the case of the word 'marriage'. I will call this interpretation of the 
marriage debate the revisionary analysis interpretation6.  
                                                          
3 Unless specified otherwise, italics in quotes are the authors'. 
4 To make explicit what Ball has left implicit in this sentence, I should add that one should respect this constraint 
only to the extent that it appears to be possible. 
5 I will, in what follows, designate the changing the subject interpretation by (Change). 
6 (Revise) in what follows. 
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The challenge for a proponent of (Revise) is to make sense of the fact that an analysis could be 
revisionary, that is, that in a situation in which participants on both sides of the debate agree on 
the meaning of the term, the received analysis could be mistaken. Sally Haslanger has been 
developing an anti-descriptivist externalist account of revisionary analysis that aims at answering 
this challenge7. My main goal in this paper is to offer a descriptivist externalist account of 
revisionary analysis as a foundation for (Revise). Giving a general argument against anti-
descriptivism for politically significant terms (terms for institutions, racial terms, gender terms, 
etc.) is beyond the scope of this paper. I will, though, by considering the word 'woman',  show how 
the argument could go for words which are not words for institutions, like 'marriage' is, and thus 
cash out on the promise made by my eye-grabbing title. 
I will start by presenting in some detail the anti-descriptivist externalist account of revisionary 
analysis (§.2), first by presenting Haslanger's views (§ 2.1.), then by exposing the weakness of 
these views and by presenting Derek Ball's contribution, which doesn't suffer from the same 
weakness (§2.2). In a nutshell, whereas it is unclear whether Haslanger's revisionary analyses can 
legitimately be called analyses, Ball's revisionary analyses, being analytic in a sense he makes 
precise, can. I will then find this account wanting (§3). After expanding a little more on the 
interpretative constraint and the requirements to which it gives rise (§3.1), I will argue that 
(Revise), under the anti-descriptivist externalist gloss, fails to satisfy this constraint (§3.2)). We 
will see that the problem for Ball comes from the fact that the arguments given in favour of 
revisionary analyses are not compatible with an anti-descriptivist externalism. These arguments 
aim at determining the (descriptive) meaning of the word as used in the law to determine in turn 
                                                          
7 'Ameliorative analysis' is Haslanger's label for 'revisionary analyses' (Haslanger 2005a). I will continue using the 
more neutral label. 
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what the essence of the institution is. After having criticized the anti-descriptivist externalist 
account of revisionary analysis I will offer as an alternative a descriptivist externalist account (§4). 
This account suggests itself if we notice that marriage is a legal institution. But then one might 
object that the legal institution is nothing but the mere formalization of the social institution by a 
legislative act and add that, if so, then anti-descriptivism does provide the proper foundations for 
(Revise). I will present this objection, argue that this is not the case and show that even if it were 
the case, the objection would still be unsuccessful: ultimately, a descriptivist externalist account 
should be favoured (§5). Finally, by considering the word 'woman', I will show that an 
interpretation founded on a descriptivist externalist account is also the best interpretation to give 
to debates over politically significant terms which are not terms for institutions, like 'marriage' is 
(§6). 
 
2. Externalist foundations for the revisionary analysis interpretation 
2.1 Haslanger's views 
In a series of paper Haslanger has developed revisionary analyses of gender and racial terms and 
investigated the consequences of such analyses (Haslanger 2000; 2004; 2005b). Later, to answer 
the charge that there are no such things as revisionary analyses, she offered an anti-descriptivist 
externalist account of revisionary analysis (Haslanger 2005a; 2006; 2010). Here is one of the 
analyses which can be found in Haslanger's influential 2000 paper: 
S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, 
political, legal, social, etc.), and S is 'marked' as a target for this treatment by observed or 
6 
 
imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female biological role in 
reproduction. (Haslanger 2000) 
To bring out the revisionary character of such an analysis it is useful to note the following 
consequence of this analysis: if the feminist movement was to be successful, there would be no 
more women to be found, or, less dramatically worded, it wouldn't be possible any more to truly 
ascribe the property of being a woman to anyone. The challenge is then to explain how this 
biconditional, whose content is undoubtedly revisionary, can rightly be called an analysis of the 
meaning of 'woman'. 
I have qualified this account of revisionary analysis as anti-descriptivist and externalist. This needs 
some unpacking. First, in one of the meanings of 'anti-descriptivism', which I adopt in this paper, 
anti-descriptivism is a metasemantic thesis about reference, that is, a thesis about the kind of facts 
which determine the fact that a word refers to some entity in the world. Descriptivists hold that the 
fact that a singular term refers to an individual is determined by the fact that this individual has the 
properties which the term represents the individual as having; and, that the fact that a general term 
refers to a set of individuals is determined by the fact that these individuals have the properties 
which the term represents them as having8. Anti-descriptivists hold that the reference of a term, 
whether a singular or a general term, is determined by the fact that a term is appropriately related 
to these entities9. Second, externalism is also a metasemantic thesis, but a thesis about the 
relationship between intrinsic psychological facts and semantic facts broadly conceived – that is, 
                                                          
8 Predicate reference is notoriously problematic (for a survey, see (MacBride 2006)). I am under no illusion that this 
characterization of a descriptivist account of predicate reference is without problems. 
9 The adjective 'appropriately' is here used as a placeholder for a specification of what this relation is supposed to be. 
There are many distinct accounts on the market. Fortunately, the details won't matter for what follows. The relation 
which holds between the term and an entity when the latter satisfies the descriptive content of the former is of course 
not among these appropriate relations. If so, descriptivism would be a kind of anti-descriptivism and therefore the 
distinction between the two would collapse. 
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not only facts about reference. Internalists hold that intrinsic psychological facts determine 
semantic facts while externalists deny that. Thus they hold at a minimum that environmental facts 
determine semantic facts jointly with psychological facts (Lau and Deutsch 2016). Externalism is 
traditionally associated with anti-descriptivism. The appropriate relation which must hold between 
a term and an entity for the former to refer to the latter has more often than not been taken to hold 
between the term and an entity external to the thinker10. Therefore, facts about reference are jointly 
determined by intrinsic psychological facts and environmental facts. However, it need not be. For 
example, on the one hand, Russell, at some point of his career, was an anti-descriptivist but thought 
that the only referential terms where those which he took to refer to sense-data, that is, entities 
which are standardly taken to be internal entities; thus - to the extent that he didn't took the 
reference of terms to be determined at least partly by environmental fact - he was an internalist 
(Russell 1912). On the other hand, Frege is widely considered to be the arch-descriptivist (Reimer 
and Michaelson 2017, sec. 2.1). But he also thought that what determines the reference of a given 
term, that is, its sense, is external to the speaker, something that the speaker grasps by an act of the 
mind (Frege 1984). 
With these preliminaries in hand, we can turn to Haslanger's anti-descriptivist externalist 
foundations for (Revise) and see that both components of her anti-descriptivist externalist account 
of revisionary analysis play a role in founding (Revise). First, for Haslanger, in the marriage 
debate, the proponent of same-sex marriage who objects does put forward an analysis in the sense 
that they give the meaning of the word 'marriage'. To see this, it is important to note that, from the 
point of view of many anti-descriptivists, the meaning of a word is the referent of the word11. It 
                                                          
10 Though there are subtleties, e.g. when terms for mental states are concerned. 
11 That is, many anti-descriptivists as I am using the term are also Millian (Reimer and Michaelson 2017). 
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follows from this that from the fact that the proponent of same-sex marriage can be interpreted as 
giving the reference of the word 'marriage' one can infer that they can be interpreted as giving the 
meaning of the word 'marriage'. Second, the analysis of the word 'marriage' put forward by the 
proponents of same-sex marriage is revisionary. From an externalist point of view, semantic facts 
are determined by both intrinsic psychological facts and environmental facts. Thus, speakers can 
be mistaken about the reference of the word they use. It thus makes sense to think that most people 
could be mistaken about what the reference of the word 'marriage' is. And it seems indeed that, in 
the context of these debates, they are so mistaken. They think that 'marriage' refers to the union of 
a man and a woman. Therefore, the analysis of the proponent of same-sex marriage is revisionary. 
In the next sub-section, we will see why Halsanger's views provide insufficient foundations for 
(Revise) and how Ball's recent contribution to the debate can help solve the problems faced by 
Haslanger's views. 
 
2.2 A problem with Haslanger's views and how Ball's contribution helps 
Haslanger's anti-descriptivist externalist account of the meaning of gender and racial terms does 
seem to solve the problem of the proponents of revisionary analyses. A revisionary analysis reveals 
what the terms referred to all along, and this reference is the meaning of these terms. It gives the 
meaning of the term (it is an analysis). And it reveals it because speakers were blind to the meaning 
of the terms they used (it is revisionary). There is, however, a potential problem for this view. 
Though Haslanger's 'revisionary analyses' can legitimately be called revisionary, it is unclear 
whether they can also legitimately be called analyses. Indeed, for something to be called an 
analysis, it seems that it should display the parts of the analyzandum, that is, in the case of meaning, 
that it should display the parts of the meaning of the word. If so, finding out with which entities 
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the word 'marriage' is appropriately related to when speakers use it doesn't qualify. A true sentence 
which displays the parts of the meaning of a word is a sentence which is true in virtue of the 
meaning of the word, i.e. analytic. Thus, it seems that in order to give an anti-descriptivist 
externalist account of revisionary analyses, an anti-descriptivist externalist must find room for the 
concept of analyticity in their account. And this is no small order, given that contemporary anti-
descriptivists typically deny that there are such things as analytic sentences (see for example 
(Williamson 2006)). In a forthcoming contribution, Ball provides the anti-descriptivist externalist 
with the resources to solve this problem and thus to provide sound anti-descriptivist externalist 
foundations for (Revise). 
To do so, Ball starts by borrowing two theses from (Boghossian 1997), (Adoption Grasp) and 
(Implicit Definition) about, respectively, what makes it the case that a speaker understands a term 
and what makes it the case that a term has a given meaning. He then amends (Implicit Definition) 
to make it compatible with anti-descriptivist externalist tenets. Let's start by quoting Boghossian: 
(Adoption Grasp): 'A term t is grasped by adoption (or a-grasped) just in case there is some 
set of truths S which is such that one understands t iff one accepts each member of S.' 
(Implicit Definition): 'A term t is implicitly defined iff we attach a meaning to t by 
arbitrarily stipulating that certain sentences involving t are to be true. More specifically, t 
has that meaning, if any, which would make true a specified set of sentences involving it.' 
Ball's move here consists in quasi-untying (Adoption Grasp) and (Implicit Definition), meaning 
that if (Adoption Grasp) is incompatible with the anti-descriptivist externalist story inherited from 
(Kripke 1980), (Implicit Definition), properly amended, is. 
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Why are these two principles incompatible with the anti-descriptivist externalist story that we find 
in Kripke? Ball takes the example of the proper name 'Ansel' introduced at an initial baptism. Such 
a baptism involves a stipulation, like 'I hereby stipulate that the following sentence is true: "The 
baby in room 110, Ninewells Hospital, at 10:00am GMT 25th April 2013, is Ansel"'. Later uses of 
the name 'have their meaning in virtue of their connection to this initial baptism' (Ball 2020, 48), 
hence to this stipulation. Given that later speakers do not need to know the stipulation with which 
the word has been introduced to grasp the meaning - i.e. reference - of 'Ansel', (Adoption Grasp) 
is false. Moreover, though (Implicit Definition) would be true if the meaning of 'Ansel' was 
completely determined by the stipulation, this is not so. Therefore, (Implicit Definition) is also 
false. However, (Implicit Definition) can be modified to register the fact that the stipulation 
partially determines the meaning of 'Ansel': 
(Partial Implicit Definition): 'A term t is p-implicitly defined iff t has the meaning it does 
at least in virtue of an arbitrary stipulation that certain sentences involving t are to be true. 
More specifically, if t has a meaning, it has a meaning which could make true a specified 
set of sentences involving it.' (Ball 2020, 48) 
Ball's next move is to define a new concept of analyticity. While Boghossian, in the very same 
paper, distinguishes between the epistemic analyticity and the metaphysical analyticity of a 
sentence which rest, respectively, on the speaker's justification for holding this sentence to be true 
or false and on the fact in virtue of which this sentence is true or false, Ball introduces the concept 
of metalinguistic analyticity of a sentence (with respect to a word) which rests on the p- implicit 
definition of a word by a stipulation: 
(Metasemantic Analyticity): 'A sentence is metasemantically analytic with respect of a 
word (or a use of a word) iff the meaning of that (use of the) word is partially fixed by the 
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stipulation that the sentence is to be true (i.e., iff the sentence p-implicitly defines t word).' 
(Ball 2020, 50)12. 
At this step, Ball grants that revisionary analyses are metasemantically analytic. However, though 
this could lead to the conclusion that revisionary analyses indeed change the subject (revisionary 
analyses would be 'a kind of stipulation that introduces a new meaning for a word' (Ball 2020, 
50)), he resists this inference. If Ball rejects, with Kripke, the thesis that competent users of a word 
'must grasp the stipulation that introduced [it]' (Ball 2020, 51) he also goes further in rejecting the 
thesis that the 'stipulations which [partially] fix the meaning of my words must be temporally prior 
to my use of those words' (Ball 2020, 51). That is, he accepts temporal externalism13.  Finally, 
Ball's last move is to regiment the talk of revisionary analysis by means of these new concepts: for 
him, 'the key to understand revisionary analyses is that they involve a stipulation that (partially) 
fixes the meaning of prior uses of the word' (Ball 2020, 51). To go back to our example, a 
revisionary analysis of 'marriage' is a partial implicit definition, in this context a stipulation, which 
fixes the meaning - i.e. reference - of prior uses of the word. 
How does this solve the problem Haslanger's view suffered from? According to Ball, a revisionary 
analysis of 'marriage' does display the parts of the meaning of the word 'marriage'. Indeed, Ball's 
concept of a partial implicit definition allows him to interpret the marriage debate as a debate over 
which statements about 'marriage' are analytic. It is revisionary because, though this partial 
implicit definition of the term 'marriage' was already the one given by the analysis, it wasn't known 
to any speakers. However, though Ball is to be commended for his resourcefulness and the 
                                                          
12 At this point, Ball notes that though 'Metasemantic analyticity has, perhaps, received less attention in the literature 
on analyticity than epistemic and epistemological analyticity […] there is nonetheless a notable tradition of using the 
word 'analyticity' to pick out metasemantic analyticity' (Ball 2020, 50). For example, Ball claims that meaning 
postulates in Montague's grammar, which fix the meaning of lexical items by restricting the range of models relative 
to which the sentences of the (formal) language are assigned semantic values, are metasemantically analytic. 
13 For an exposition and defence of the view, see (Jackman 1999; 2005). 
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innovative character of his proposal, I will argue in the next section that anti-descriptivism fails. 
To start with, we will see in the next sub-section that (Revise), under the anti-descriptivist 
externalist gloss, actually doesn't satisfy the interpretative constraint set forth by Ball himself. 
 
3 How anti-descriptivism fails 
3.1 Interpretation, explanation and the broader picture 
In this subsection I will start by taking a step back and discuss interpretative matters. In the 
introduction of this paper I have stated Ball's interpretative constraint and the two requirements to 
which it gives rise. My intention is not to question these constraints - they rest on norms of 
charitability in interpretation which are widely taken to be uncontroversial. I want instead to put 
them in broader perspective. This will allow me to evaluate Ball's proposal. 
We want a good interpretation of the marriage debate, but what for? By saying that we are looking 
for an interpretation of this debate we mean that we want to determine what the participants to the 
debate are thinking. And we want this as a way of understanding what they are doing. Therefore, 
a good interpretation provides us with an explanation of why participants to the debate utter the 
sentences they utter. From this perspective, an interpretative constraint is a constraint on the 
explanations which should be preferred to others. And, according to the constraint given by Ball, 
we should prefer explanations according to which participants to the debate are rational. While 
according to the first requirement we should prefer to ascribe participants to the debate knowledge 
or at least justified beliefs, according to the second constraint, we should ascribe them actions 
which are appropriate to their aims. That is, the rationality in question is both, respectively, 
theoretical and practical. Now, one might wonder whether (Revise), under the anti-descriptivist 
13 
 
externalist gloss, actually satisfies the rationality constraint. Ball thinks that it does. However, I 
think it doesn't and I now want to show why. 
To start with, here is Ball's anti-descriptivist externalist account of revisionary analysis: 
Revisionary analyses can be seen as a kind of (attempted) stipulation, and so as attempts at 
giving metasemantic analyticities; but if they are successful, they fix the meaning of words 
as we have always used them (even before the stipulation took place) (Ball 2020, 56) 
Moreover, the difference between the success and the failure of a revisionary analysis is, Ball tells 
us, that 'the successful analysis is accepted, and the failed analysis is rejected' and he wants the 
success of the attempted stipulation to be a response to an argument: 'accepting a view can count 
as a stipulation, even though it is also a response to an argument'. The problem is that he leaves us 
in the dark on what these arguments are14. Why is this a problem? Isn't it too much to ask of Ball 
that he should tell us what they are? It isn't. In order to show us that (Revise), under the anti-
descriptivist externalist gloss, is the right interpretation to give of the marriage debate, Ball should 
show us that the said arguments are compatible with his anti-descriptivist externalism. And to do 
so, he does need to tell us what these arguments are. What this means is that in order to properly 
interpret the marriage debate, one cannot focus only on the three steps argument(s) that Ball 
focuses on. One has to look at the kinds of arguments which are given for and against, e.g., premise 
(1) of the argument given at the opening of this paper, namely, 'A marriage is a union of a man 
and a woman'. I contend that if one looks at the broader picture, one sees that (Revise), under the 
anti-descriptivist externalist gloss, cannot be the right interpretation. These arguments are 
                                                          
14 Another problem is that, even if we grant Ball that stipulating and accepting a view can be seen as the same 
speech act, it is unclear how a stipulation, which is arguably a speech act distinct from an assertion, could be the 
conclusion of an argument (being a response is not enough). But this problem is not a problem for anti-descriptivism 
in general, it's only Ball's, and, moreover, it is unclear that it requires more from Ball than that he adjusts his view. 
As the problem I am about raise is general and cuts deeper, I will set it aside. 
14 
 
incompatible with an anti-descriptivist externalism: they aim at determining the (descriptive) 
meaning of the word as used in the law to determine in turn what the essence of the institution is. 
The proponent of (Change) presupposes that the participants to the debate indeed do not have a 
genuine disagreement and ascribing such an error to these participants goes against the rationality 
constraint. (Revise), on the other hand, doesn't ascribe such an error to these participants. It is thus 
preferable to (Change). However, let us look at the following question: why do (some) gay and 
lesbian rights activists choose this kind of argumentative strategy? Why, for example, don't they 
recognize that a marriage is indeed a union between a man and a woman and go on to argue that 
this is wrong (for whatever reason) and that, consequently, marriage should be replaced by another 
institution? 
There are at least two very good reasons to choose this kind of argumentative strategy. First, gay 
and lesbian pro-same-sex marriage activists are fighting to have the same rights as heterosexuals. 
But, if one were to show that the existing institution already applies to people of the same sex then, 
it would show that they actually already have the same rights. Thus, this is a very direct and 
efficient argument. Second, it is strategically much better to argue that the existing institution 
already applies to people of the same sex, if possible. Indeed, it would make the recognition of 
same-sex marriage a far less important change than if the existing institution didn't apply to people 
of the same sex and thus needed to be changed. This answer clearly satisfies the interpretative 
constraint put forward by Ball: these are good reasons! Now, can an anti-descriptivist make sense 
of this strategy. They cannot. Determining what marriage is amounts to determining what an 
institution is. But institutions are transparent to their creators. However, without a lack of 
transparency, there is no room for an anti-descriptivist theory of reference to operate: anti-
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descriptivism needs a discrepancy between manifest properties and essential properties to get off 
the ground. There is a lot to unpack in this remark. I will do so in the next sub-section. 
 
3.2. What is the debate on same-sex marriage about? Against anti-descriptivism (I) 
Participants to the debate want to determine what marriage is, that is, what the essential properties 
of marriage are15. In general, in order to determine what the essential properties of a given entity 
are, it is helpful to proceed as follows. One first determines to which broad category the entity 
belongs to. (Is this a biological species, a chemical element?). This restricts the space of answers 
which can be given to the essence question; arguably, the essential properties of biological species 
are not of the same kind as the essential properties of chemical elements. (According to many if 
not most philosophers of biology, biological species have a historical essence16). Then one 
determines what the best available theory for entities of this given kind is. (The best theory about 
biological species is evolutionary theory). Finally, one reads off what the essential properties of 
this entity are from this theory. Turning now to marriage, how should we answer these questions? 
To start with, marriage is an institution17. It is often difficult to specify the kind of an entity without 
entering straight away in theory, but a somewhat neutral view of institutions is as a stable set of 
roles occupied by agents, these roles being characterized by deontic powers (there are things agents 
                                                          
15 As many have now pointed out, there is a whole range of possible essence concepts, from weak to strong ones 
(see e.g. (Beebee 2013) and references therein). In using the word 'essence' I don’t intend to commit myself to any 
specific one. Therefore, my characterization of the debate shouldn't be seen as controversial. 
16 For a defence of this essentialist thesis, see (Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt 2007). 
17 Or, maybe, instances of marriages (e.g. the marriage between Wafa and Salah) are institutions. Probably both; my 
intuitions are not firm on this. In any case, what follows can be reformulated to fit the proper usage if necessary. The 
word 'marriage' can also designate a social event. However, we are here concerned with the institution itself. 
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who occupy these roles have the right to do, the duty to do, the permission to do…)18. A 
consequence of this is that saying that marriage is an institution is very likely to be loose talk still. 
Presumably the deontic powers married people have e.g. in the UK and the US are distinct. If so, 
then marriage in the UK is one institution, while marriage in the US is another19. By default, my 
reader should assume that I talk about a specific institution. Not only is marriage an institution, it 
is a legal institution. To say of something that it is a legal institution amounts to saying that the 
roles which have to be occupied by agents for this institution to exist are determined by law, which 
is itself a product of legal institutions - in the more restricted sense of institutions which legislate, 
adjudicate, execute, administrate and enforce the law20. 
To continue, collective acceptance theories of institutions are widely taken to be the best available 
theories of institutions. According to these theories, institutions constitutively depend on collective 
intentional states; institutions exist in virtue of collective intentional states, they are not merely 
caused by them, that is, if these states were to cease to exist, they would also cease to exist21. 
According to Searle, whose theory is the most well-developed and which is at the heart of most of 
the discussions on institutions, institutions exist and are maintained by the collective acceptance 
of 'constitutive rules', that is, judgements of the following form: 'In virtue of satisfying some 
conditions C, an agent has deontic powers constitutive of entities of kind K.' and the existence of 
the agents satisfying conditions C. More formally: 
                                                          
18 It should be obvious that I here focus on but one of the many meanings of the word 'institution'. According to this 
understanding, though parliaments, hospitals and corporations are institutions, a law, money and the Queen of 
England aren't. 
19 What allows me to talk of marriage in the UK and marriage in the US are the commonalities between these two 
institutions. On which more in sec. 4. 
20 What MacCormick calls 'institutional agencies' (2007, chap. 2.9). 
21 Authors disagree on the nature of these collective intentional states, with, among others, some thinking that 
collective intentions are of the form 'we intend' (Searle 2010), others thinking that they are individual states 
interrelated in specific ways (Bratman 1999) and others still thinking that they are the intentions of the group itself 
(Gilbert 1989). This need not concern us here. 
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x is K ↔ [CA(x is K if C) & C]; where 'CA' stands for 'Collective Acceptance'22 
For example, it is collectively accepted that under specific conditions, some people have, among 
others, the right to arrest people and that this right is one of the rights constitutive of being a police 
officer. Moreover, police officers are one of the entities that needs to exist for a police institution 
to exist23. 
In this essay, I am not concerned with answering the question of the essence of marriage. It is 
enough for my purpose to determine the kind of arguments participants to the marriage debate can 
use. One of the factors on which the kind of arguments participants to the debate depend is the 
kind of epistemic access to institutions people have. In a couple of papers (Thomasson 2001; 
2003), Amie Thomasson has argued that we have an epistemic privilege with regard to institutional 
kinds in that those involved in their creation and maintenance 'are guaranteed freedom from 
complete ignorance and are preserved from error' (Thomasson 2003, 590) in many of their beliefs 
about these entities24. As Thomasson stresses, a consequence of the fact that the existence of 
institutions depends on the satisfaction of the conditions C laid out in the constitutive rules 
collectively accepted in a given community is that it cannot turn out that members of this 
community are wrong in thinking that, for example, satisfying conditions C is sufficient for being 
a police officer and that it cannot turn out that they are wrong about the kinds of entities which 
need to exist for the police institution to exit. 
                                                          
22 This formalization is borrowed from (Guala 2010). 
23 I should note that Searle's theory is meant to have a broader scope than just institutions as I defined them. Searle 
takes all the entities which fall within the scope of his theory to be institutions, that is, Searle makes a different use 
of the word 'institution' than I do in this paper. He does, however, have this account of what I call institutions: 'A 
corporation is a set of placeholders for a set of actual power relationships among actual people' (Searle 2010, 22). 
24 Thomasson's account is distinct from Searle's account as I have just presented it – in part for the obvious reason 
that Searle's latest book on the topic was published after Thomasson wrote her article. It is not so different, however, 
that it makes it impossible to make the same point she makes from inside Searle's theory. For the sake of brevity and 




Thomasson's argument can be extended25. Thomasson's point is that from the fact that the 
collective acceptance of constitutive rules and the existence of agents which satisfy the conditions 
laid out in these constitutive rules create entities, we can infer that if the conditions C obtain then 
a corresponding entity of kind K cannot but be created and, moreover, we can also infer that the 
members of this community, if they know that the conditions C obtain, cannot but know this fact. 
We might now ask whether the two converses are also true, namely, is it the case that when an 
entity of kind K exists, the corresponding conditions C obtain and that the members of this 
community cannot but know it?  
If the answer to the first question were no, it would mean that two distinct constitutive rules for 
the same entities of kind K are collectively accepted by the members of this community (indeed, 
an entity cannot but be created by collective acceptance of constitutive rules). This, however, 
cannot be. constitutive rules do not exist in a vacuum. They are grounded in the concept of the 
entity the community has, a concept which specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something to be an entity of kind K26. As a consequence, the conditions C are meant to be essential 
to entities of kind K. Conditions C are essential to entities of type K if an entity cannot be of type 
K without the conditions C obtaining. However, if there are two sets of conditions C, this situation 
can obtain. Therefore, if there are two sets of conditions C, they cannot be essential. In conclusion, 
when an entity of kind K exists, the corresponding conditions C obtain. Moreover, as the members 
of the community create entities on the basis of the concept of the entity they possess, they cannot 
but know this to be the case; hence one should also answer the second question by the affirmative. 
                                                          
25 I will run this argument only for entities of kind K themselves, but the same point also applies to the things they 
constitute, namely, institutions. 
26 Thomasson makes this point in a discussion of the epistemology of artefacts (Thomasson 2007). 
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To sum up: first, when an entity of kind K exists, the corresponding conditions C obtain and 
reciprocally, and second, the members of the community who created the entity cannot but know 
this to be the case. Going back to the anti-descriptivist rendering of (Revise), it is clear that anti-
descriptivism is inconsistent with this privileged access, as Thomasson also noted. 
Indeed, according to anti-descriptivism it could always turn out that the members of a community 
are wrong in thinking that satisfying a set of conditions C is sufficient for being a K. It is after all, 
the lesson of Putnam's Twin Earth's experiment: there is on Twin Earth a drinkable colourless and 
odourless (etc.) liquid substance but this substance is not water, but Twater. Moreover, it could 
also always turn out that the members of a community are wrong in thinking that something being 
a K implies that conditions C are satisfied. It is, after all, the lesson on which rests Kripke's modal 
argument when applied to natural kind terms: ‘Water might not have been the watery stuff’ is true 
(Kripke 1980)27. But we've just seen that the opposite is true for institutions28. 
                                                          
27 On modal arguments for both singular and natural kind terms, see (Kallestrup 2011, chap. 2.2). 
28 (Guala 2010) is an extended attack on arguments in favour of infallibilism about human kinds which take off from 
collective acceptance theories, like Thomasson's. In the space of this paper, I cannot provide an extended discussion 
of Guala’s paper. I will limit myself to a few remarks. Guala first argues by way of counterexamples. He argues that 
people had wrong theories about witches and had/have wrong theories about money. As neither witches nor money 
are institutions as I defined them, I need not discuss these cases. But he also takes the lessons he draws from the 
money case to apply widely. His argument for this claim takes less than one page of a twenty pages paper and as a 
consequence, it is not clearly laid out. But fortunately, I need not be concerned with it, as I think that Guala's very 
strategy is mistaken. 
Guala takes research in social science to show that some facts about (some?) institutions cannot but be known a 
posteriori (I take him to mean that among these facts are facts about these institutions' essential properties). The 
lessons he draws from this is that the theory of collective acceptance is 'best interpreted as an ideal type or idealized 
model like those found in science' (Guala 2010, 262). But both claims can and should be resisted. The first claim 
presupposes that anti-descriptivism is true of institutional terms and that social scientists and folks alike mean the 
same thing when they use them (if both assumptions are true then the fact that the folks are mistaken does suggest 
that some facts about (some?) institutions cannot but be known a posteriori), but he gives no argument for either one 
of these assumptions. Instead of inferring from the discrepancy between (some of) our concepts of institutions and 
research in social science that the essence of these institutions cannot but be known a posteriori, one could infer that 
our concepts, unbeknownst to us, don’t refer to anything. Second, though insisting that, unbeknownst to us, some 
institutions actually don't exist might look like digging in one's heels, it is not so. The theory of collective 
acceptance is not best interpreted as 'an ideal type or idealized model like those found in science'. This is a category 
mistake. These ideals are normative. The conditions C which have to obtain to be a K are the conditions the agent 
ought to satisfy. (That many if not most institutions are produced by the law is not merely incidental.) And, whether 
the conditions laid out in constitutive rules are satisfied or not, the mere fact that individuals collectively accept 
them is key to explaining the social world. Guala might want to say that even if this is right, collective acceptance 
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(Revise), under the anti-descriptivist externalist gloss, is therefore not a good interpretation of the 
marriage debate. The analysis which proponents of and opponents to same-sex marriage seek to 
provide is a conceptual analysis (i.e. an analysis along descriptivist lines). If this is a conceptual 
analysis, it can aptly be called revisionary because, arguably, most of the time, the meaning of the 
word is not known but by experts: in the process of determining the meaning of the term 'marriage' 
non-expert participants to the debate change their belief about the meaning of the word. What can 
secure the revisionary character of this theorizing is thus an externalist theory of meaning. 
Therefore, the right interpretation of the marriage debate is (Revise), but under a descriptivist 
externalist gloss. In the next section, I will lay out the view in more detail. 
 
4 Descriptivist externalist foundations for the revisionary analysis interpretation 
To start with, I want to highlight the fact that descriptivist externalist foundations for (Revise) 
differ from anti-descriptivist externalist foundations in a crucial respect. There isn't merely one 
concept of marriage, there are many concepts of marriage. On the one hand, when in her book on 
marriage Elizabeth Brake briefly traces the history of marriage (Brake 2012), she uses the word 
'marriage' to refer to many non-legal and legal institutions across time, space, and cultures. As for 
Ball, I assume that he writes with both the debate which takes place in the US and the debate which 
took place in Great Britain in mind. Additionally, he makes no mention of the law.  He thus seems 
to be using the word 'marriage' to refer to a social institution which can be found, now, in different 
locations and cultures. I, on the other hand, use the word 'marriage' to refer to a specific legal 
institution in a specific country. Again, my use of the phrase 'marriage debate' should be seen as 
                                                          
theories are under a misconception as to what they are really doing. Maybe so, in part, but this is of no consequence 
for what follows. 
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nothing but loose talk. In fact, I take it that the we are interested in marriage debates. The fact that 
we can consider these debates together shows that there are interesting commonalities between 
them and thus, that the concept Ball is using is operative in the background. But this doesn't mean, 
however, that we are interpreting a debate which happened/happens in several countries. We are 
interpreting debates, which occurred/occur in several countries. Having this distinction in mind 
forces us to see that a marriage debate (as characterized in this paper) could turn at the advantage 
of the proponent of same-sex marriage in some countries and at their disadvantage in other 
countries. It all depends on the nature of their respective laws. 
This legal nature of the institution in these debates is what allows for both the descriptivist and the 
externalist views which found (Revise). I start by descriptivism. Collective acceptance theory 
prima facie presupposes that all the people who create institutions and support their existence have 
a clear idea of what these institutions are. This feature could prompt the objection that the theory 
is too intellectualistic. However, the constitutive rules which determine the existence of legal 
institutions are codified in texts. Therefore, whatever the merits of this objection are, it doesn't 
apply to a collective acceptance theory of legal institutions. So, the legal nature of the institutions 
is what allows collective recognition theory to straightforwardly apply to them. And, as we have 
seen, a descriptivist view about the term 'marriage' according to which participants to the marriage 
debate are analysing the meaning of the term 'marriage', follows from collective acceptance theory. 
So, the legal nature of institutions is what allows for the descriptivist view which found (Revise).  
I now move to externalism. Arguably, a legal institution like marriage is not created by the 
collective recognition of the rule constitutive of marriage by all the members of a society29. In a 
democracy, the members of the legislature, on behalf of the citizens of the state, collectively 
                                                          
29 As we have seen, such a creation is also conditional on some fact obtaining. 
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recognize the rules constitutive of marriage and in doing so create the conditions for the existence 
of marriages. As a consequence of this, participants to the debate who are not members of the 
legislature don't have the privileged access members of the legislature have, as I have argued for 
in the previous sub-section, in Amie Thomasson's wake. This means that in order to analyse the 
meaning of the word 'marriage', they need to defer to experts, namely, the members of the 
legislature, who, conveniently enough, have put the constitutive rules in writing in the form of 
laws3031. So the legal nature of institutions is what allows for the externalist view which found 
(Revise). 
If we go deeper into the argumentative strategies which are used in these debates, we find that they 
have another feature that descriptivist externalist foundations can also help explain. Debates on 
same-sex marriage often revolve around the question of what functions marriage has. Among the 
many functions which have been ascribed to marriage are 'recognizing and supporting adult caring 
relationships', 'designating and supporting parenting' (Brake 2012). It is obvious from this list that 
some of these functions are friendlier to same-sex marriage than others. But if the debate is about 
constitutive rules, how can the function of the institution be relevant to what it is? The answer is 
that legislators have created the institution to serve some specific goal. What grounds the ascription 
                                                          
30 In saying that the law is the product of the legislator, I gloss over a huge debate in general prudence over judicial 
law-making. See for example (Raz 1979). 
31 (Torrengo 2017) stresses the importance of deferential beliefs in social construction, that is, beliefs according to 
which 'enactments produced according to certain established procedures determine social constraints, rights, duties, 
and the like' (Torrengo 2017, 80). This is in line with what I have just said. Torrengo, however, wants to go further. 
If I understand him correctly, he wants to say that the ascription of a general intention to defer to the members of a 
community is in tension with the specificity of the institutions thus created: collective acceptance theory 'has great 
difficulty explaining how often very imprecise and general shared content can ground complex and often detailed 
institutional profiles' (Torrengo 2017, 83) (see also (Torrengo 2017, 75). However, one might hold, as I did 
implicitly, that the institution is created, and its existence supported by, the collective acceptance of the agents the 
members of the community defer to, not by the deferential attitudes of the members of the collectivity itself. Of 
course, these agents wouldn't be able to create these entities if they didn't have these deontic powers and these 
deontic powers are conferred to them by the members of the collectivity, but this is just to say that if the building 
blocks of social reality break, the whole edifice collapses. Torrengo conflates two types of dependence. Torrengo 
also wants to say that there are some cases in which there are no experts because he follows (Guala 2010). For a 
reply to Guala, see fn.27. 
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of a function to the institution here is this very goal that was pursued by the creators of the 
institution in creating it32. Now, determining what the function of the institution is can in turn allow 
the participants to the debate to read the law (as text) correctly, that is, to determine what the 
constitutive rules for marriage are, and thus what marriage as a legal institution is. Therefore, it 
makes sense that the participants to a debate over what marriage is would care for an answer to the 
question of what the function(s) of marriage is(are)33. 
In both the previous section and this one, I have made use of specific views of the social ontology 
of legal institutions. Notice, though, that these views could ultimately turn out to be false while 
my interpretation of the debate could still be true. This can be seen by reflecting on the fact that 
the interpretative constraint on the interpretation of the marriage-debate Ball set forth for us and 
that I abided to is that 'we should look for an interpretation of these arguments and our response to 
them that makes sense of what we are doing', not that the assumptions participants to the debate 
make should ultimately turn out to be true. I hope that my reader thinks that the view I have 
presented is reasonable and as a consequence does make sense of what we are doing when we take 
part in the marriage-debate. In the next section, I will discuss the objection that the legal institution 
is nothing but the mere formalization of the social institution by a legislative act and add that, if 
so, then anti-descriptivism does provide the proper foundations for (Revise). This will give me the 
opportunity to better articulate the relations between marriage as a legal institution and marriage 
as a social institution. 
                                                          
32 I here endorse a design theory of institutional functions. As institutions are routinely taken to be artefacts and as 
design theories of artefact functions, according to which the function of an artefact is the use the designer of the 
artefact wanted to put it to (Preston 2009), are the most widely shared, this should be uncontroversial (Ehrenberg 
2016). 





5 Marriage as a legal and social institution: an anti-descriptivist reply rebutted 
Anti-descriptivists might argue that lawmakers, in passing marriage laws, aim at designating and 
supporting marriage as a social institution and add that the anti-descriptivist view can best make 
sense of the debate over a social institution. Consequently, by making sense of the debate over 
marriage as a social institution, anti-descriptivists ultimately also make sense of the debate over 
marriage as a legal institution. Though the point is well-taken, I think that it is ultimately 
inconclusive, as I will now argue. I will argue against both conjuncts of the reply, starting by the 
latter. 
Asserting that the debate over marriage as a legal institution is reducible to the debate over 
marriage as a social institution is much too quick, for at least two reasons. First, when we are trying 
to determine what marriage as a legal institution is, the legal material outstrips marriage law. This 
gives us a reason to doubt that the legal institution is nothing but the mere formalization of the 
social institution by a legislative act. Second, even if this is the case, there are reasons to think that 
in some contexts legislators actually do not defer to the social understanding of what marriage is. 
I will take these two points in turn. Though I haven't make this clear to this point in this paper, 
laws, in the sense of the word which interests us here, are to be distinguished from statutory 
provisions, constitutional provisions, regulations, etc34. Therefore, it’s not the case that marriage 
as a legal institution is nothing more than marriage as a social institution formalized, even if 
lawmakers aim at designating and supporting it. And consequently, the debate over the nature of 
marriage as a legal institution doesn't amount to a debate over the nature of marriage as a social 
                                                          
34 On the distinction between the conditions of individuations of law and the conditions of individuations of statutes, 
regulations, etc., see (Raz 1980, chap. IV). 
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institution. To illustrate, in the Supreme Court case Obergefell vs Hodges35, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America was also invoked 
in the debate, alongside the marriage law of the state of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee. 
One of the questions was whether classification along the line of sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification and, as a consequence, whether the Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee 
legislations had to pass the standard of strict scrutiny (i.e. whether it had to be shown that the state 
had a compelling interest in designating and supporting a view of marriage which excluded same-
sex couples). Thus, in order to determine what marriage was, it was necessary not only to 
determine what it was according to the legislators, but also what it could and could not be according 
to the Constitution; a text which cannot be suspected of deferring to the use contemporary 
Americans make of the word ‘marriage’. 
Moving to my second reason to doubt that the debate over marriage as a legal institution is 
reducible to the debate over marriage as a social institution, and continuing with this case, the 
attorney for the state of Michigan, Jack Bursch, actually didn't ascribe to members of the legislature 
the intention of deferring to the social understanding of marriage. In doing so, he intended to show 
that Michigan marriage law passed the standard of strict scrutiny. Indeed, he argued that the state 
interest was in binding children with their biological parents, not promoting love and commitment, 
and, assuming that this interest was legitimate, tried to show that allowing same-sex marriage 
would have interfered with this interest (by alluding to the detrimental consequences that same-
sex marriage would have had on opposite-sex marriage). But this definition of marriage would 
have excluded sterile different-sex couples from marriage - as was pointed out by the liberal 
justices on the Court – and therefore, was at odds with the social understanding of marriage. Now, 
                                                          
35 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). 
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given that the state of Michigan did grant marriage licenses to sterile opposite-sex couples, the 
attorney for the State was presumably being disingenuous. In any case, we can imagine cases in 
which lawmakers, in order to make sure that a status excludes a part of the population from some 
benefits or restricts the liberties of a part of the population, would pass a law that is at odds with 
the social institution, with the purpose of actually promoting this social institution. And 
consequently, the debate over the nature of marriage as a legal institution doesn't necessarily 
amount to a debate over the nature of marriage as a social institution. 
Of course, my objector could reply that though there are cases in which the space of possible 
marriage institutions is restricted by rights and cases in which legislators do not intend their 
characterization of marriage as a legal institution to track the characterization of marriage as a 
social institution, there are also simple cases. Moreover, my objector could argue that, even if there 
are no such simple cases, designating and supporting marriage as a social institution is what 
motivates lawmakers and that the proponents of same-sex marriage in fact argue about marriage 
as a social institution, not marriage as a legal institution, in order to erode this motivation. I am 
happy to grant both these points, for the sake of the argument. However, I contend that the second 
part of the anti-descriptivist reply I have been examining in this section, that is, the assumption 
that anti-descriptivism makes sense of the debate over marriage as a social institution, is mistaken. 
Only the descriptivist externalist can make sense of this debate. Indeed, it would have been absurd 
for same-sex marriage activists to claim that same-sex unions were marriages if the use everybody 
made of the word to designate the social institution had contradicted this claim. The strategy was 
to argue that the word was being applied by many to same-sex couples, namely, to argue – along 
externalist lines – that, unbeknownst to some of its users, this is what the word now meant and 
thus what the social institution was. Therefore, a descriptivist externalist account can be given of 
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the debate over the social institution which parallels the account given of the debate over the legal 
institution, with the distinction that, while there were experts in the latter case (the legislators), 
there are prima facie no parallel authorities in the former case. In the next sub-section, we will see 
how an interpretation founded on a descriptive externalist account can also be given of another 
debate, namely, the recent debate in the UK over the recognition of transwomen as women. 
 
6 What is the debate on the recognition of transwomen as women about? Against anti-
descriptivism (II) 
Though I suspect that anti-descriptivism will never be in a position to make sense of any debate 
over politically significant terms, giving a general argument for this conclusion is beyond the scope 
of this paper. I will, however, take another example, with the aim of showing that the irrelevance 
of anti-descriptivism will not be limited to cases in which the debate is about the character of a 
legal or a social institution. 
On February 10 2004 the Gender Recognition Act was passed by the House of Lords and on May 
25 2004 it was passed by the House of Commons, getting Royal Assent on July 2004. The aim of 
the legislature was to make it possible for transsexual women and men to be able to be identified, 
respectively, as women and men on their official documents. In 2016, the committee for Women 
and Equality published a review of the act noting its deficiencies and making recommendations 
for its review (Wikipedia contributors 2018). In July 2017 the Government Equalities Office 
announced a new proposal for reforming the act and the opening of a consultation in autumn 2017. 
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The recommendation of the committee for Women and Equality was that the law should be 
modified to make it easier for transwomen and transmen to be identified, respectively, as women 
and men. The proposal was that the parliament was to allow for the recognition of someone as a 
woman or a man on the ground of her or his self-identification. This proposal has been met with 
strong opposition by feminists – many of them self-identifying as radical feminists - who took 
issue with this criterion on the ground that, among other things, it could be used by non-transgender 
ill-intentioned males to have easy access to public spaces otherwise reserved to females in order 
to harass, assault and/or rape them and that it would render impossible data-gathering and 
monitoring of sex-based discrimination. Transwomen were actually already allowed, under the 
2010 Equality Act to access gender-specific spaces without any Gender Recognition Certificate, 
though a provider of services could, with justification, prevent them from entering such spaces. 
The fear was both that the revision of the Gender Recognition Act would embolden ill-intentioned 
men (as adult male humans) to enter gender-specific spaces and that the Equality Act would be 
modified to make it impossible for a provider of services to actually prevent transwomen from 
entering gender-specific spaces36. I will now offer an interpretation of this debate along the lines 
presented in the foregoing. 
Much of the literature on the meaning of 'woman' consists in a reaction to Haslanger's proposed 
revisionary analysis, which I quote once again: 
S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, 
political, legal, social, etc.), and S is 'marked' as a target for this treatment by observed or 
                                                          
36 A grassroot organization opposed to the reform the Gender Recognition Act, a Woman' s Place, provides evidence 
that this idea has indeed been in the air: 'Evidence of Calls to Remove Single Sex Exemptions from Equality Act.' 
WomansPlaceUK, 27 June 2018, womansplaceuk.org/references-to-removal-of-single-sex-exemptions/. 
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imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female biological role in 
reproduction (Haslanger 2000) 
As I wrote in the above, this analysis is revisionary in the sense that if the feminist movement was 
to be successful, there would be no more women to be found. But this analysis has also been found 
unpalatable for another reason. The analysis has been found to exclude transwoman and thus to 
fail for lack of inclusiveness37. So, an anti-descriptivist will ascribe to the proponents of the reform 
of the Gender Recognition Act the view that in fact, as Jenkins argues, the word 'woman' also 
designates transwoman. But the opponents to the reform of the Gender Recognition Act may 
happily accept this and instead focus on what the law is and argue that according to the law, 
transwomen are not women. Therefore, the anti-descriptivist doesn't make sense of the debate over 
the Gender Recognition Act. 
Here is how one can formulate the argument of the opponents to the reform of the Gender 
Recognition Act. First, though transwomen can enter some gender-specific spaces, thanks to the 
Equality Act, providers of services can, also thanks to this act, legitimately prevent them from so 
doing. This suggests that though the act can help protect transwomen, the rights of female human 
animals are recognized by the law as having a special character and as needing to be secured. 
Second, the actual Gender Recognition Act has been instituted primarily for transsexual 
individuals. If people are under no obligation to actually submit themselves to a sex reassignment 
procedure in order to secure a Gender Certificate, it doesn't mean that the Gender Recognition Act 
wasn't meant to apply to transsexuals. This is presumably for ethical and political concerns. In 
summary, woman as female human animals are offered special protection by the law - in the sense 
                                                          
37 See  (Jenkins 2016), cited approvingly in (Diaz‐Leon 2016). 
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of a protection which is specific to them – and the Gender Recognition Act aims at extending this 
protection to transsexual individuals. As a consequence, according to the law, transwomen are not 
women. 
Of course, it is open to the opponent to the reform of the Gender Recognition Act to argue 
otherwise, namely, that though according to the law transwomen are women, they shouldn't be, 
and it is also open to the proponent of the reform to reply to the argument I have presented that, 
though according to the law transwomen are not women, they should be. However, this is not the 
kind of debate I am interested in in this paper, because this is not the kind of debate anti-
descriptivist views have aimed to make sense of. In the case of the marriage-debate the revisionary 
proposal was made by the proponents of same-sex marriage and the conservative proposal was 
made by the opponents to same-sex marriage. In the present debate, the revisionary proposal is 
made by the proponents of the reform of the Gender Recognition Act and the conservative proposal 
is made by the opponents to this reform. In neither case is any side of the debate thinking that the 
other side is replacing the word 'woman' with another one because both sides are concerned with 
what the word under examination means in the law. If one side is revisionary it is because they 
oppose the belief which is the most widely shared belief (that marriage is institution which concern 
people of different sexes and that women are human female animals). 
 
7 Conclusion 
Participants to debates about same-sex marriage disagree about whether the law of their respective 
countries should allow same-sex marriage. Many (if not most) of the arguments put forward by 
opponents to same-sex marriage purport to show that, by definition, persons of the same-sex 
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cannot get married. To this argument, many (if not most) of the proponents of same-sex marriage 
respond that a marriage is not a union between a man and a woman and the opponents to same-sex 
marriage do not always reply by way of metalinguistic arguments, like: 'This is not what we mean 
by 'marriage'. I have called this argumentative exchange the marriage debate.  
I have argued that the interpretation according to which what the proponents of same-sex marriage 
do when they object to the thesis that two persons of the same sex cannot get married, is giving a 
revisionary analysis of the word 'marriage', is the wrong interpretation to give of these debates, 
when under an anti-descriptivist externalist gloss. Indeed, the anti-descriptivist externalist view 
fails to make sense of this debate. Participants to these debates over same-sex marriage are arguing 
about what the legal institution is. Therefore, if one wants to make sense of these debates, one has 
to adopt a descriptivist externalist view of the meaning of the word 'marriage'. Discussing the 
objection that the legal institution is nothing but the mere formalization of the social institution by 
a legislative act and add that, if so, then anti-descriptivism does provide the proper foundations for 
(Revise) has allowed me to better articulate the relations between marriage as a legal institution 
and marriage as a social institution. We have seen that these relations are not as simple as one 
might have thought. In any case, a descriptivist externalist view alone was up to the task. 
Though in the space of this paper I couldn’t give a general argument for the conclusion that anti-
descriptivism will never be in a position to make sense of any debate over politically significant 
terms, I have showed that the irrelevance of anti-descriptivism will not be limited to cases in which 
the debate is about the character of institutions. I have argued that the debate over the meaning of 
the term 'woman' relative to the potential revision of the Gender Recognition Act in the UK is a 
debate over the proper characterization of the class of persons that the lawmakers had the intention 
to protect in promulgating the Gender Recognition Act and the Equality Act.  
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To the outsider's eye, this whole discussion will no doubt seem like a useless academic skirmish. 
However, I don't think it is. Anti-descriptivist views about the meaning of politically significant 
terms make little or no sense of the arguments given by political activists. This is already bad in 
itself. It is even worse when it dooms the interventions of philosophers who endorse these views 
to political irrelevance. 
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